Introduction
A debate persists in the United States over the significance of a civil-military gap.
According to Peter Feaver, Richard Kohn and Lindsay Cohn, "The [fundamental] concern is that a 'gap' in values or attitudes between people in uniform and civilian society may have become so wide that it threatens the effectiveness of the armed forces and civil-military cooperation." 1 Studies of the civil-military gap often focus on identifying its many features at a single point in time. There are at least two problems with this approach. First, it is difficult to discern which features of the civil-military gap, if any, are threatening. Second, and more crucial, it is difficult to assess how the civil-military gap is changing over time.
2
This study addresses these problems by identifying and considering one important feature of the civil-military gap over a period of time. Two contemporary and compelling studies conclude that attitude differences between the civilian and military elite on social issues are a pivotal feature of the civil-military gap because they have the potential to significantly impact military effectiveness.
3 Indeed, a RAND study concluded the elite's perspectives on social 1 Peter D. Feaver, Richard H. Kohn, and Lindsay P. Cohn, "The Gap Between Military and Civilian in the United States in Perspective," in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001 ), 1.
2 One example of these circumstances is Thomas Ricks' article cited at the end of this note. He follows a group of Marines that are reintegrating into society following 11 weeks in boot camp. He illustrates how they experience "reentry shock" because the military's culture is significantly different from society. He raises many concerns about the culture gap and proposes an array of solutions to address the problems. This approach tends to be alarmist and misses the realities of civil-military relations over time. Because he is a respected journalist, his views were taken quite seriously, spawning further studies. Thomas E. Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between Military and Society," The Atlantic, July 1997, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/07/the-widening-gap-between-militaryand-society/306158/.
issues are the only significant area of divergence linked to military effectiveness.
4 Interestingly, the RAND study also found that both the civilian and military elite sampled in the study "appear to be significantly more likely to identify with the Republican Party and to assert a more conservative ideology than the population as a whole." 5 Using the RAND study's conclusions as a point of departure, this study examines the attitudes of the elite on the issue of women in combat (WIC), the first of three social issues cited by RAND. 6 This study examines WIC from the end of the Gulf War through the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (1991 to 2013) because significant changes to law and policy regarding women's service occurred during this period.
The study's central question is this: How and why have the attitudes of the civilian and military elite changed on WIC during this period, and what are the implications for the civil-military gap?
Ultimately, the wars served as a proving ground, illustrating to the civilian and military elite that women serving in ground combat roles had both society's acceptance and a positive impact on military effectiveness, thereby harmonizing their attitudes. This implies the civil-military gap is not currently cause for concern.
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45 David Freddoso, "Rumsfeld Retains Aspin's Rules," Human Events, May 19, 2003 . It appears there is a logical disconnect in these two quotes from the same spokeswoman at the same event. It reflects the tension between observing social values and achieving military effectiveness. It appears as if the Army was willing to overlook the intent of DOD policy (to prevent women from experiencing combat conditions) to continue to place women where they needed them for effectiveness sake. Navy, stated of the quiet, ''What it means is that our view of women has changed… So people see this as less horrible. The horror of death is equal now.'' 47 The Army's force posture also increasingly exposed women to ground combat conditions. Due to manning and retention challenges, the Army altered its internal policy to allow women to be assigned to Forward Supply Companies (FSC), which are non-combat units attached to units with a direct ground combat mission. The Army appears to have skirted the DOD policy, using creative wording and conditions to rationalize the change. uphold the current policy and allow women to continue to serve in the roles prescribed by the Army.
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Rumsfeld responded by indicating the Army was working with Congress and battlefield commanders "to find an appropriate way that's consistent with our country's view on that subject."
57 The Army leadership responded, "The proposed amendment will cause confusion…and will send the wrong signal to the brave men and women fighting the global war on terrorism. This is not the time to create such confusion." 58 The Army also released a statement describing how its use of women in FSCs complied with DOD policy, illustrating the important contributions women were making to the wars. 68 Ibid., 8. movement, and then sustained by 'refreezing' new behaviors and attitudes."
72 Warfare serves as a vehicle for social and cultural change, but the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in particular, aided women's inclusion in combat roles through this unfreeze-refreeze process. Second, the MDLC echoed, "combat exclusion policies do not reflect the current operational environment." 73 Third, and most important, the MDLC found the argument that WIC would reduce unit cohesion and military effectiveness had little evidence to support it. Indeed, "a majority of focus group participants felt that women serving in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan have had a positive effect on mission accomplishment." 74 The MDLC indicated the combat exclusion policies prevented commanders from picking the most capable members. Overall, the MDLC decided by a majority vote to recommend all combat exclusion policies be rescinded using a phased approach. The policy excluding women from ground combat roles was rescinded in January 2013. 
Conclusion
A fundamental concern in the debate about a civil-military gap is that the space between the values or attitudes of civilian society and the military may become so wide it threatens civilmilitary cooperation and military effectiveness. This study sheds light on that concern by examining the elite's attitudes on WIC, a social issue at the heart of the gap, as the nation regrouped after the Gulf War then fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. It revealed that the military elite, who have historically limited women's roles due to concerns over a negative impact on military effectiveness, expanded women's roles primarily to increase military effectiveness but also to mirror society's values. It revealed that civilians facilitated and monitored the expansion of women's roles primarily to synchronize with society's values, while simultaneously respecting military concerns for effectiveness. Ultimately, the expansion of women's roles served as a proving ground, illustrating to the civilian and military elite that women's service had both society's acceptance and a positive impact on effectiveness, thereby harmonizing elite attitudes.
Although debate of the issue was significant, it is evident the civilian and military elite engaged in frank dialogue on mutual interests to constructively reconcile their differences over time and agreed to favor military effectiveness over social values because national security was at stake. With social values residing at the heart of the civil-military gap, this study suggests that the civil-military gap is neither a chasm nor unbridgeable. The nature of the relations of the civilian and military elite suggests there is no immediate cause for concern.
